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The paper analyzes whether nonfinancial firms as large blockholders of the 
Brazilian firm shape dividend policy. Under the Agency Theoretical framework 
a set of good corporate governance practices is suggested as able to control 
management activity and prevent managers from incurring in moral hazard 
problems and the emergence of excessive management power as predicted 
by the Managerial Power Hypothesis. In this context, the Management 
Monitoring Hypothesis proposes that dividend policy may be used as a 
management control mechanism given that dividend distribution affects the 
free cash flow available for managers. Dividend models were estimated by 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) for an unbalanced panel data, 
composed of 1.890 firm-year observations of 234 companies listed on the 
BM&FBovespa, in the period 1996-2012. The results indicate that nonfinancial 
firms as large shareholders increase dividend payout which leads to the 
reduction of free cash flow. This result is in accordance with the monitoring 
hypothesis which predicts the reduction of free cash flow available for 
managers through dividend policy. 
KEY-WORDS: Dividend policy. Management monitoring hypothesis. 
Ownership structure. Nonfinancial firm as dominant blockholder. Brazil. 
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Firmas não financeiras como grande acionista usam política de 
dividendos para monitoramento da gestão no Brasil 
RESUMO 
O artigo analisa se empresas não financeiras como grandes acionistas da 
empresa brasileira ajustam a política de dividendos. Sob o marco teórico da 
Agência, um conjunto de boas práticas de governança corporativa é sugerido 
como capaz de controlar a atividade de executivos e evitar que estes incorram 
em problemas de risco moral e surja o problema de excesso de poder da 
gestão como previsto pela Hipótese do Poder Gerencial. Neste contexto, a 
Hipótese de Monitoramento da Gestão propõe que a política de dividendos 
possa ser usada como mecanismo de controle dos executivos, uma vez que 
a distribuição de dividendos afeta o fluxo de caixa livre disponível. Modelos 
de dividendos foram estimados pelo Método de Momentos Generalizados 
(GMM) para um painel de dados não balanceado, constituído por 1.890 
observações anuais de 234 empresas listadas na BM&FBovespa no período 
1996-2012. Os resultados indicam que as empresas não financeiras como 
grandes acionistas incrementam o pagamento de dividendos, o que leva à 
redução do fluxo de caixa livre. Este resultado está de acordo com a hipótese 
de monitoramento que prevê a redução do fluxo de caixa livre disponível para 
os executivos através da política de dividendos. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Política de dividendos. Hipótese de monitoramento da 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Relevant works highlighted the importance of dividend policy under 
distinct theoretical frameworks and gave rise to a prominent body of research 
(Black, 1976; Lintner, 1956; Miller & Modigliani, 1961). Recent literature 
pointed out that it still remains an open topic of study with important questions 
that deserve attention about dividend policy determinants (Gopalan, Nanda, & 
Seru, 2014; L. E. Harris, Hartzmark, & Solomon, 2015; Javakhadze, Ferris, & 
Sen, 2014; Mori & Ikeda, 2015; Renneboog & Trojanowski, 2007). 
Financial decisions are crucial for any company given the importance 
they have on firm value, and on firm performance. Among the main firm 
financial decisions are the ones related to investment and capital structure 
policies, as well as dividend policy. Every company looks for the perfect 
combination of these policies in order to adequately maximize firm growth 
opportunities and increase firm value in the mid and long run. A large amount 
of research has been undertaken focusing on the relation between this set of 
firm policies and market imperfections that are able to moderate them (Barclay 
& Smith, 2005; M. Harris & Raviv, 1991; Stein, 2003). This body of research 
has found that indeed financial decisions matter for firms, contrary to the 
predicted irrelevance of investment funding and dividend policy over firm value 
by the perfect market framework proposal of Modigliani and Miller, 1958). 
Dividend is central in this context since it is related to the cash flow available 
for management use. The reduction in dividend payout favors the increase in 
cash flow directed to firm investment funding, thus reducing the need for 
external funds (M. Harris & Raviv, 1991; Myers, 1977, 1984; Pindado & De la 
Torre, 2006; Stein, 2003). 
The institutional and legal environment has been seen as a factor that 
matters for dividend policy given that the legal rules in each country may shape 
shareholder protection and behavior (Javakhadze et al., 2014; La Porta, López-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). Under the Agency Theory framework, 
agency conflicts seem to have a role on dividend policy. For instance, a number 
of shareholders consider dividend policy relevant for different reasons. 
Dividend is an important investment return for shareholders although firm 
value creation is even more important. Dividend policy is also related to the 
availability of internal funds for investment funding which is an important 
source of financing according to the Pecking order theory. Dividend payout will 
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also determine the free cash flow available for managers, something that is 
dangerous for firms without good investment opportunities. In this vein, 
corporate governance and ownership structure emerge as important factors 
that could influence firm dividend policy given the interests of different groups 
of shareholders (Florackis, Kanas, & Kostakis, 2015; Gopalan et al., 2014; 
Harada & Nguyen, 2011; Jensen, 1986; Khan, 2006; La Porta et al., 2000; 
Lee, Liu, Roll, & Subrahmanyam, 2006; Mori & Ikeda, 2015). 
In the context of the agency conflicts between shareholders and 
managers there is a set of good corporate governance practices that are 
suggested as able to control management activity and prevent managers from 
incurring in moral harzard problems and the emergence of excessive 
management power as predicted by the Managerial Power Hypothesis (Guthrie, 
Sokolowsky, & Wan, 2012; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In fact, some agency 
models that take into account corporate governance practices and the role of 
shareholders have been proposed for the explanation of the relationship 
between ownership structure and dividend policy (Florackis et al., 2015; 
Gopalan et al., 2014; Harada & Nguyen, 2011; Khan, 2006; Mori & Ikeda, 
2015). 
The relevance of research about dividend policy in emerging markets 
has increased with the growing importance of such economies and also for the 
fact that the institutional and legal environments have specific nuances that 
may interfere in shaping dividend policy (Javakhadze et al., 2014; La Porta et 
al., 2000). In this context, Brazilian market has a set of specific characteritics 
that makes it an important economy that requires attention: the greatest 
economy in Latin America, high firm ownership concentration, low protection 
of minority shareholders, minimum mandatory dividend policy of 25% of net 
income in Brazil (Law no. 11.638/2007), high private benefits of control that 
favor large controlling shareholders (Brandão & Crisóstomo, 2015; Dyck & 
Zingales, 2004; Holanda & Coelho, 2014; Procianoy & Verdi, 2009). Besides, 
some macroeconomic events also make dividend policy an interesting topic to 
be analyzed in Brazil: the drop in inflation, from 1994, and the process of post-
stabilization, the growth of stock market capitalization, and the importance 
given to the adoption by firms of good corporate governance practices 
(Moreiras, Tambosi Filho, & Garcia, 2012; Procianoy & Verdi, 2009). Most of 
the studies about dividend policy in Brazil started after the economic 
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stabilization in the 1990’s. Studies focusing on agency conflicts and dividend 
policy are still scarce (Martins & Famá, 2012). 
Given that dividend distribution is related to cash flow available for 
management use, debt or dividend policy may be used as instruments to avoid 
excess free cash flow in hands of managers (Jensen, 1986). This work aims to 
assess whether dividend policy of Brazilian firm is shaped by one relevant 
aspect of ownership structure, the presence of nonfinancial firms as the 
dominant controlling stockholder. The possible positive effect of high 
ownership concentration in hands of nonfinancial firms on dividend payout is 
studied. Such positive effect could signal that these controlling shareholders 
may be using dividend policy as a management control mechanism. 
For a representative panel data composed of 1.890 firm-year 
observations relative to 234 companies, in the period 1996-2012, the results 
indicate that indeed there is a positive effect of nonfinancial firms as large 
controlling shareholders on dividend payout of the Brazilian firm, which is in 
line with the management monitoring hypothesis. 
This document has the following structure. In the next section, 
theoretical framework addressing the issues involving dividend policy, 
ownership structure, and the agency conflicts that drive the monitoring 
hypothesis are concatenated. Then, data source, the procedures for the data 
collection, and the methods used for data analysis are presented. At 
continuation, results are exhibited and commented. Finally, concluding 
remarks are offered. 
 
2 DIVIDEND POLICY AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
2.1 DIVIDEND POLICY AND AGENCY CONFLICTS 
 
By showing that dividend policy is not irrelevant for firms Lintner (1956) 
provided an important contribution to dividend policy research. According to 
Lintner, firm managers avoid reducing dividend distribution and adjust it 
periodically in a way to avoid dividend volatility higher than firm earnings per 
share. Since Lintner’s contribution, a body of research on dividend policy has 
been built. This initial research on dividend policy led to the important proposal 
that firm income seems to be a central factor on dividend payout which has 
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almost become a consensus with evidence documented (Fama & Babiak, 1968; 
Lintner, 1956; Short, Zhang, & Keasey, 2002; Waud, 1966). Besides the reality 
that profitability seems to be an important determinant of dividend payout, the 
question of which firm attributes moderate firm dividend policy has been the 
focus of important research and remains an open avenue for investigation 
(Black, 1976; Bøhren, Josefsen, & Steen, 2012; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & 
Skinner, 2008; Gordon, 1959; Gutiérrez Urtiaga & Sáez Lacave, 2014; Lintner, 
1956; Miller & Modigliani, 1961). 
Among the possible determinants for dividend policy, dividend tax 
treatment emerged as an important one in different markets according to 
distinct shareholders’ interests (Denis & Osobov, 2008; Graham & Kumar, 
2006; Haesner & Schanz, 2013). For example, in UK, pension funds have a 
great tax incentive to demand for dividends, being tax-exempt institutions, 
which makes the tax system very favorable to dividends in comparison to the 
tax treatment of capital gains (Bond, Chennells, & Devereux, 1995). Firm size 
has also been proposed as an important determinant of dividend payout under 
the argument that larger firms are more stable and less inclined to depend on 
available cash flow for investment (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner, 2004). 
Jensen (1986) called attention to the dividend distribution to 
shareholders as able to create agency conflicts. Since then, research has 
focused on this aspect of dividend policy. Under the agency conflicts theoretical 
framework, the use of dividend policy has also been pointed out as an 
additional mechanism for management monitoring given that high dividend 
payout reduces the free cash flow submitted to discretionary managerial 
control, this way functioning as an important instrument for management 
monitoring (Harada & Nguyen, 2011; Jensen, 1986; López-Iturriaga & 
Crisóstomo, 2010). 
 
2.2 DIVIDEND POLICY AND NONFINANCIAL FIRM AS THE CONTROLLING 
SHAREHOLDER 
 
The excess power of controlling shareholders has been the focus of 
attention of important body of literature on corporate governance given that 
relevant firm blockholders have incentives and ability to maintain internal 
control systems that fit their interests and ease the use of private benefits of 
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control as predicted by the expropriation effect argument (Brandão & 
Crisóstomo, 2015; Crisóstomo & Brandão, 2016; Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This excess power of 
controlling blockholders may also hold for the management monitoring 
hypothesis which is closely related to dividend policy. 
Ownership concentration has been found as able to benefit management 
monitoring given that shareholders with greater power will be willing to bear 
the control costs, thus overcoming the free-rider problem, which is a strong 
characteristic of companies with low concentrated ownership in which 
shareholders with a low proportion of ownership have little interest in assuming 
monitoring costs for the benefit of all (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). This proposed 
effective action of high ownership concentration in monitoring management 
activity has been a topic of attention in the literature since long (Claessens & 
Djankov, 1999; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985).  
The rationale on the management monitoring action and dividend policy 
is related to firm investment opportunities and the free cash flow available for 
managers. Under the Pecking Order proposal, a firm with good investment 
opportunities will try to maximize internal funds so that such a firm will tend 
to retain profit and restrict dividend payout and direct cash flow to finance 
investment (Myers, 1977; Myers & Majluf, 1984). On the other hand, if the 
company does not have good growth opportunities, there would be no need, 
or justification, to retain profit and constrain the payment of dividends. In fact, 
in such a situation, higher dividend distribution may interesting for 
management monitoring given that it reduces the free cash flow available for 
the manager without good investment opportunities, restricting his 
discretionary power over free cash flow, thus limiting the eventual misuse of 
funds available, this way reducing the possibility that the manager incurs in 
moral risk (Jensen, 1986; La Porta et al., 2000). 
There is an argument that suggests that the nature of relevant 
blockholders is able to affect firm investment and financing policies. The 
rationale is that better and more timely informed blockholders positively 
influence communication with external creditors. In this vein, certain 
blockholders may also be more effective in monitoring firm management, 
reducing the possibility of managerial misuse of internal funds (Goergen & 
Renneboog, 2001). 
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A number of works found evidence on the influence of controlling 
shareholders on firm investment and financial policies which may be related to 
dividend policy as abovementioned. Other firms in ownership structure appear 
as important players in this context signaling that such blockholders seem to 
be well and timely informed about firm investment opportunities and funding 
sources. In fact, there is evidence that the membership to corporate groups in 
Japan and India improves access to external credit market (Hoshi, Kashyap, & 
Scharfstein, 1991; Lensink & Van der Molen, 2010; Manos, Murinde, & Green, 
2007). Also in the context of investment policy, the presence of a nonfinancial 
firm as a relevant blockholder favors investment policy and reduces the 
intensity of financial constraints in USA (Allen & Phillips, 2000). By being well 
and timely informed about firm growth opportunities and firm financial status, 
another firm as the controlling blockholder will be able to adequately decide 
on the best source of funds, internal or external, to maximize growth 
opportunities. This way, they will shape dividend policy that best fit their 
interests. 
In the case of Brazil, the scenario shows a huge presence of a 
nonfinancial firm as the controlling stockholder (Crisóstomo, 2011) which 
signals a great interest on diversification and return maximization. In 
summary, the rationale is that a nonfinancial firm as the company’s controlling 
shareholder will decide to use dividend policy for management monitoring by 
increasing dividend payout in the presence of free cash flow. 
Hypothesis: Nonfinancial firm as the dominant controlling shareholder 
increases dividend payout given that dividend policy is used as a 
management control mechanism to reduce free cash flow 
available for managers. 
3 MODELS AND ECONOMETRIC METHOD 
 
Four dividend models are estimated to test the proposed hypothesis that 
another firm as the controlling shareholder leads to a positive effect of dividend 
payment: the Full Adjustment Model (Lintner, 1956), the Partial Adjustment 
Model (Lintner, 1956), the Waud Model (Waud, 1966), and the Earnings Trend 
Model (Fama & Babiak, 1968). In accordance with the proposals of Short et al. 
(2002) these models are modified by the inclusion of an interactive dummy 
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variable to account for the potential positive effect of a nonfinancial firm as the 
controlling shareholder, proxied by the presence of such a shareholder as the 
major one, on dividend policy as proposed under the monitoring hypothesis 
rationale. 
 
3.1 THE FULL ADJUSMENT MODEL (FAM) 
 
Model of Equation (1) stands for the Full Adjustment Model (FAM) that 
relates earnings (E) and dividends (D) for firm i at time t. Under the rationale 
of the Full Adjustment Model, if changes in income are permanent and a firm 
has a target payout ratio, then there is a positive link between changes in 
earnings (Ei,t - Ei,t-1) and changes in dividends (Di,t – Di,t-1) (Lintner, 1956). 
The proposal that a nonfinancial firm as the controlling shareholder may bias 
the payout ratio justifies the inclusion of a proxy for such a presence in the 
model, as done by Short et al. (2002). The hypothesis that firms with a 
nonfinancial firm as the controlling shareholder may follow a higher payout 
ratio may be tested by the inclusion of a cross variable that interacts changes 
in earnings (Ei,t - Ei,t-1) and a dummy variable (NFFCS) that is set to 1 if the 
firm-year observation has a nonfinancial firm as the major stockholder. This is 
the model in equation (1) that also controls for firm size (FSIZE). 
Di,t – Di,t-1 = β0 + β1 (Ei,t - Ei,t-1) + β2 [(Ei,t - Ei,t-1)·NFFCS] + β3 FSIZE + µi,t (1) 
Coefficient β1 is expected to be positive signaling that dividend changes 
follows earnings changes, β2 is hypothesized to be positive suggesting that the 
presence of a nonfinancial firm as the controlling shareholder favors dividend 
payout with the purpose to reduce free cash flow available for managers. 
In model of equation (1) and the three next ones, Dividend (D) is the 
annual firm dividend distributed to stockholders. The presence of a nonfinancial 
firm as the controlling shareholder is proxied by the dummy variable NFFCS 
that accounts for the presence of a nonfinancial firm that holds more than 50% 
of voting shares. The variable Earnings (E) corresponds to the annual firm 
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3.2 THE PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT MODEL (PAM) 
 
Equation (2) corresponds to the Partial Adjustment Model (PAM) 
(Lintner, 1956). The Partial Adjustment Model suggests that the target level of 
dividend distribution (D) for firm i at time t is related to firm earnings (E). This 
way, changes in dividend payout (Di,t – Di,t-1) will be directly affected by 
earnings and previous dividends.  
The hypothesis that a nonfinancial firm as the controlling shareholder 
may induce higher dividend payout is tested with the use of a dummy variable 
that is set to 1 when there is such a blockholder. Then we construct a cross 
variable that interacts earnings for firm i at time t (Ei,t) and the dummy variable 
(NFFCS) that indicates the presence of a nonfinancial firm that holds more that 
50% of voting shares. This is the model in equation (2) that also controls for 
firm size (FSIZE). The partial adjustment process of the dividend change is 
considered by accounting for the effect of previous dividend payout (Di,t-1 and 
Di,t-2) on dividend change. 
Di,t – Di,t-1 = β0 + β1 Ei,t + βi,t [Ei,t·NFFCS] + β3 Di,t-1 + β4 FSIZE + µi,t     (2) 
3.3 THE WAUD MODEL (WM) 
 
The Waud Model (WM) (Equation 3) uses aspects of both the full and 
partial adjustment models. The Waud Model proposes that the target 
dividend distribution, for firm i at time t, is directly related to the long-run 
expected earnings. The actual dividend change follows a partial adjustment 
process, and the formation of expectation about earnings follows an adaptive 
expectation model (Short et al., 2002; Waud, 1966). 
The proposal that a nonfinancial firm as the major shareholder leads to 
higher dividend payment is tested by the inclusion of a cross variable that 
interacts earnings (E) and the dummy variable that accounts for the 
presence of a nonfinancial firm as the dominant shareholder (NFFCS) so that 
the coefficient β2 of the cross variable (Ei,t·NFFCS) is expected to be positive 
according the monitoring hypothesis. 
Di,t – Di,t-1 = β0 + β1 Ei,t + β2 [Ei,t·NFFCS] + β3 Di,t-1 + β4 Di,t-2 + β5 FSIZE + µi,t 
(3) 
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3.4 THE EARNINGS TREND MODEL (ETM) 
 
The Earnings Trend Model (ETM) (Equation 4) is a modified version of the 
partial adjustment model. The ETM considers that there is a profit generating 
process for firm i at time t, in a way that previous earnings affect present 
earnings (Fama & Babiak, 1968; Short et al., 2002). The model also assumes 
that dividend payout target is dependent on expected earnings, following an 
adjustment process on which previous earnings and dividends are able to 
explain dividend change. 
Assuming the explanatory power of ownership concentration on dividend 
policy, the profit generating process integrates a cross variable that interacts 
the dummy variable that accounts for the presence of a nonfinancial firm as 
the major stockholder (NFFCS) and previous earnings (Ei,t-1). Under the 
monitoring hypothesis rationale the coefficient of [Ei,t-1·NFFCS] is expected to 
be positive. As the others, this model also controls for firm size. 
Di,t – Di,t-1 = β0 + β1 Ei,t  + β2 Ei,t-1 + β3 [Ei,t-1·NFFCS] + β4 Di,t-1  + β5 FSIZE + µi,t  
(4) 
4 METHOD AND SAMPLE 
 
4.1 ECONOMETRIC METHOD 
 
Models are estimated using panel data methodology. This method allows 
the treatment of unobservable heterogeneity associated with fixed firm effects 
that can be eliminated from the equation through variable transformation by 
first differences (Arellano & Bover, 1990). Coefficients are estimated using 
Arellano and Bond’s (1998) system estimator that is more adequate when the 
period of study is relatively short and provides better estimators (Blundell & 
Bond, 1998). Models are estimated using the two-step system estimator (SE) 
with adjusted standard errors for potential heteroskedasticity (Blundell & Bond, 
1998). This method takes into account the unobserved effect by transforming 
the variables into first differences and using the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) to deal with endogeneity problems. Endogeneity may occur 
for three factors (Wooldridge, 2002): (i) variable omission, that is related to 
unobserved variable due to difficulties in obtaining data; (ii) variable 
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measurement errors, that is related to problems in data collection or imperfect 
instruments; (iii) simultaneity, that occurs when there is a mutual relation 
between the dependent and the explanatory variable. 
Validity of model estimations has been checked through the Hansen test 
of over-identification of restrictions. This test examines the lack of correlation 
between the instruments and the error term. The use of first-difference 
transformations may lead to some degree of first-order serial correlation that 
does not invalidate the results. However, the presence of second-order serial 
correlation does signal omitted variables and this absence of second-order 
correlation in the residuals has been checked by the Arellano-Bond test of 
second order auto-correlation in the residuals. 
Due to high variance, variables have been log transformed. The 
presence of negative values led to the application of a log transformation that 
takes that situation into account. This way, variables have been log 
transformed to natural logarithm following the methodology of Elnathan, 




This log transformation is monotone and information-preserving. As 
can be seen, it ensures that L(X) is defined when X is zero (by the addtion of 




The sample used is an unbalanced panel data of 1.890 firm-year observations 
related to 234 companies in the period 1996-2012. This period allows the 
assessment of firm dividend policy in Brazil in a long period of time which 
makes results more consistent. Annual financial and ownership data of 
Brazilian firms have been collected from the Economática database. Table 1 
allows one to see that sample firms are distributed among a diversity of 12 
sectors of the economy in Brazil. Only firm-year observations with complete 
data about dividends, earnings, and ownership concentration have been kept 
ln (X + 1),      X ≥ 0 
- ln (-X + 1),  X < 0 
121 




FUTURE STUDIES RESEARCH JOURNAL         ISSN 2175-5825         SÃO PAULO, V.10, N.1, P. 109 –131,  JAN. / ABR. 2018 
 
in the sample. The late availability of ownership data resulted in a reduced 
number of observations in the initial years of study. 
 





Industry N % N % 
Mining, steel and chemical products 401 21.22 46 19.66 
Electric energy, gas supply, and water 268 14.18 32 13.68 
Building e transportation 258 13.65 33 14.10 
Business sector service 248 13.12 37 15.81 
Food, drink e tobacco 150 7.94 21 8.97 
Textile, clothing, leather and footwear 143 7.57 18 7.69 
Trade and retailing 107 5.66 10 4.27 
Machinery and equipment 96 5.08 11 4.70 
Communication and media 73 3.86 10 4.27 
Petroleum, gas and fuel products 73 3.86 8 3.42 
Wood, paper and paper products 65 3.44 6 2.56 
Other miscellaneous industries 8 0.42 2 0.85 
 1.890 100.00 234 100.00 
 
 
5 DISCUSSION AND RESULT ANALYSIS 
 
Chart 1 presents the movement of net profit and dividend payout 
throughout the period of study. There seems to be a joint movement of 
dividends and earnings as predicted in dividend studies since the early 
proposals about the determinants of dividend payout under the rationale that 
dividend payout requires benefit (Fama & Babiak, 1968; Lintner, 1956; Waud, 
1966). Theoretical proposals on dividend policy suggest that there is 
information content on dividend changes about future earnings. The 
proposition is that dividend increase transmits good news while dividend 
decrease is interpreted as bad news, and that the market is sensitive to such 
changes (Bhattacharya, 1979; John & Williams, 1985; Miller & Rock, 1985). 
Furthermore, it is also observed that firms indeed try to keep dividend payout 
policy, avoiding decrease as predicted in the literature (Black, 1976; X. He, Li, 
Shi, & Twite, 2016; Z. He, Chen, Huang, Pan, & Shi, 2016; Lintner, 1956). 
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Chart 1:  Evolution of net profit and dividends along the period of study 
 
Note: Values of net profit and dividends (divided by 1 million). 
 
Table 2 shows the numbers on the presence of a nonfinancial firm as 
the dominant shareholder in Brazil. In fact, there is a high proportion of firms 
on which there is another firm as the dominant stockholder, i.e., holding more 
than 50% of voting shares. Throughout the period of study, on average, 
24,23% of Brazilian listed firms have a nonfinancial firm as the controlling 
blockholder. This situation highlights the relevant role played by a nonfinancial 
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Table 2:  Presence of a nonfinancial firm as the controlling 
shareholder 
 
Firm has another 
nonfinancial firm as 
the controlling 
shareholder 
Firm does not have 
another nonfinancial 




Year N % N % N 
1996 1 50.00% 1 50.00% 2 
1997 4 30.77% 9 69.23% 13 
1998 18 25.35% 53 74.65% 71 
1999 26 24.53% 80 75.47% 106 
2000 33 27.50% 87 72.50% 120 
2001 37 28.46% 93 71.54% 130 
2002 42 31.34% 92 68,66% 134 
2003 43 30,94% 96 69,06% 139 
2004 40 28,57% 100 71,43% 140 
2005 37 28,91% 91 71,09% 128 
2006 33 24.81% 100 75.19% 133 
2007 33 22.45% 114 77.55% 147 
2008 31 21.53% 113 78.47% 144 
2009 29 20.28% 114 79.72% 143 
2010 21 16.94% 103 83.06% 124 
2011 15 13.27% 98 86.73% 113 
2012 15 14.56% 88 85.44% 103 
Total 458 24.23% 1432 75.77% 1890 
 
The proposal that the presence of a nonfinancial firm as the controlling 
shareholder influences dividend policy is contrasted by estimating the models 
presented in section 3: Full Adjustment Model (FAM), Partial Adjustment Model 
(PAM), Waud Model (Waud) and Earnings Trend Model (ETM). Such traditional 
dividend models were adjusted to include the presence of a nonfinancial firm 
as the controlling shareholder.  
Results exhibited in Table 3 show that, in fact, changes in dividend policy 
are influenced by firm earnings (E) and changes in earnings (Ei,t-Ei, t-1) which 
is in accordance with the initial proposals about dividend payout (Fama & 
Babiak, 1968; Lintner, 1956; Waud, 1966). Firm profit coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant related with dividend policy, confirming the theory 
that the payment of dividends is associated with firm profit. This is consistent 
in the four models estimated (FAM, PAM, Waud, ETM). Present earnings (Ei,t) 
have a positive effect on dividend distribution as can be observed in models 
PAM, Waud and ETM. 
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Looking at the effect of the presence of a nonfinancial firm as the major 
shareholder over dividend policy, it can be noticed that the presence of such 
controlling shareholder (Ei,t·NFFCS) favors positive changes on dividend 
distribution (DIV – DIVi,t-1). This result confirms that the presence of a 
nonfinancial firm as the major shareholder, i.e, with more than 50% of voting 
rights, is a factor than contributes to the increase of dividend distribution as 
hypothesized under the rationale of the monitoring hypothesis. 
 
Table 3:  Model estimates for the effect of the presence of a nonfinancial firm 




FAM PAM WM ETM 
Eti-E(t-1)i 0,195***    
(Eti-E(t-1)i)·NFFCS 0,637***    
Eti  1,738*** 0,163*** 0,918*** 
E(t-1)i    -0,368* 
Eti·NFFCS  1,177** 0,555***  








D(t-2)i   0,190***  
FSIZE 0,203** 4,931** 0,660*** 0,792* 
N 1890 1890 1890 1890 
F 56,39*** 32,80*** 29,44*** 7,22*** 
J de Hansen 0,154 0,436 0,296 0,278 
AR (2) 0,106 0,928 0,112 0,114 
Note: FAM = Full Adjustment Model, PAM = Partial Adjustment 
Model, Waud = Waud Model, ETM = Earnings Trend Model. In all 
models, the dependent variable is the change on dividend 
distribution (DIV – DIVt-1). E = firm earnings in year t. D = firm 
dividend distribution in year t. NFFCS = dummy variable that is 
set to 1 when the firm i has a major shareholder (a shareholder 
with more 50% of voting shares) in year t. Hansen is the test of 
overidentifying restrictions. AR2 is the test of absence of second-
order correlation in the residuals. ***,**,* correspond to 
statistical significance of the coefficients at 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
As previously mentioned, validity of models were checked through the 
Hansen test of over-identification of restrictions. The Hansen test examines 
the lack of correlation between the instruments and the error term. The use of 
first-difference transformations may lead to some degree of first-order serial 
correlation, although this correlation does not invalidate the results. As shown 
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in Table 3, the Hansen test does not reject the null hypothesis of valid 
instruments. Additionally, the presence of second-order serial correlation, 
which does signal omitted variables, was tested through the Arellano-Bond test 
of second order serial correlation (AR2). As can be seen in Table 3, the AR2 
test did reject the null hypothesis that predicts the absence of second order 
auto-correlation in the residuals. 
Overall, the findings that the presence of a nonfinancial firm as the 
dominant controlling shareholder increases dividend payout in the Brazilian 
market are robust for a set of distinct relevant dividend models. Model 
estimates have produced consistent results that give support for the 
hypothesis that there exists a positive relation between dividend payout and 
the presence of a nonfinancial firm as the dominant controlling shareholder of 
the Brazilian firm. In fact, such positive association is a strong indication that 
a nonfinancial firm as the dominant controlling shareholder, as proxied by the 
presence of a nonfinancial firm as the major shareholder, favors the use of 
dividend policy as an instrument for management monitoring. 
 
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Dividend policy under the Agency conflicts theoretical framework seems 
to have been the main focus of attention of dividend policy research more 
recently, following the body of literature that has found results signaling the 
dependency of dividend payout on the earnings level and the trend of firms in 
maintaining dividend policy. In fact, there seems to be preferences for dividend 
policy from different stakeholders –shareholders or managers–. Ownership 
structure has been considered as able to matter for a number of firm policies, 
among them, the dividend policy. 
The agency conflicts dealt under the Agency Theory have been studied 
and some hypotheses on the link between such conflicts and dividend policies 
have been proposed. Among them is the monitoring hypothesis that predicts 
the use of dividend policy for management monitoring purposes, given that 
dividend payout is closely related to the free cash flow available for managers. 
Less cash flow available for managers reduces the risk of moral harzard. 
The objective of this work was to analyze the effect of a nonfinancial firm as 
the controlling blockholder on the dividend policy of the Brazilian firm. A 
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nonfinancial firm as the controlling shareholder is powerful enough to decide 
on firm policies based on its complete knowledge about the firm and its growth 
opportunities. Such a controlling shareholder may be interested in dividend 
payout for investment return. However, the higher payout may be even more 
related to the interest in reducing management discretionary power over free 
cash flow as proposed by the monitoring hypothesis. 
The analysis of the results show that indeed a nonfinancial firm as the 
controlling blockholder of the Brazilian firm is directly related to higher levels 
of dividend distribution which is a strong signal that a nonfinancial firm uses 
dividend policy for management monitoring purposes. Besides, the results also 
show that firm earnings has an important role on dividend adjustments as 
traditionally proposed. As theoretically predicted, firm size is also positively 
related to dividend distribution. 
The paper contributes to the debate on dividend policy by providing 
evidence from an important emerging market where such research still 
requires further development. The evidence provided that nonfinancial firm as 
the controlling shareholder matters for dividend policy in Brazil helps to better 
understand the role of ownership structure on firm policies. 
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